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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Glacier National Park (GNP) is investigating the possibility of accelerating the process of reconstructing
the Going-to-the-Sun Road in the Park which is typically open sometime in June through the third week
of October. Two alternative reconstruction ideas are being considered by GNP.
Accelerated Reconstruction Alternative A would take 9-10 years at a cost of $90-105 million. This
alternative would provide access to the pass from both sides of the park on a one-lane road with hour-long
delays for passing traffic during June through August, with full closure of both sides of Logan Pass after
Labor Day.
Fast-Track Reconstruction Alternative B would take 4-6 years at a cost of $70-85 million. This
alternative would provide access to the pass from one side of the Park only (either from the west side
while the east is being reconstructed or from the east side while the west is being reconstructed).
Either Alternative would have substantial negative economic impacts due to losses in tourism.
Accelerated Reconstruction Alternative A:
• $161 million dollars in direct tourism dollar loss to the state.
• $258 million in total losses to the state.
• $125 million dollars in direct tourism dollar loss to the Glacier area.
• $225 million net direct loss to the state accounting for construction gains.
• Statewide, the lodging industry would lose $30 million, retail would lose $39 million, restaurant &
bar would lose $28 million, gasoline and oil losses would be $33 million, and all other losses would
be $31 million.
Fast-Track Reconstruction Alternative B (4-year completion scenario):
• $81-$84 million in direct tourism dollar loss to the state.
• $129-$135 million in total losses to the state.
• $63-65 million in direct tourism dollar loss to the Glacier area.
• $99-$105 million net direct loss to the state accounting for construction gains.
• Statewide, the lodging industry would lose $15-$16 million, retail would lose $20-$21 million,
restaurant & bar would lose $14 million, gasoline and oil losses would be $16-17 million and other
losses would be $15-$16 million.
Fast Track Reconstruction Alternative B (6-year completion scenario):
• $126-$129 million in direct tourism dollar loss to the state.
• $202-$207 million in total losses to the state.
• $98-$101 million in direct tourism dollar loss to the Glacier area.
• $173-$179 million net direct loss to the state accounting for construction gains.
• Statewide, the lodging industry would lose $24 million, retail would lose $31-$32 million, restaurant
& bar would lose $22 million, gasoline and oil losses would be $26-$27 million and other losses
would be $24-$25 million.
It is not expected that additional studies to further define the economic impact to the state and the Glacier
area would produce a substantial change in the numbers. Therefore, an additional study with primary data
collection is not needed. Instead, it is recommended that a team of interested individuals cooperate to
design and implement a Reconstruction Survival Marketing Plan. The survival plan should provide ideas
and implementation procedures to decrease the potential impact of visitor loss to the Glacier Area and the
State of Montana if either Alternative A or B is chosen for reconstruction.
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INTRODUCTION
At the June 1998 Tourism Advisory Council meeting, the Institute for Tourism and Recreation
Research (ITRR) was asked to postpone one approved project and replace it with a project
dealing with the economic impact of road construction on the Going-to-the-Sun road (GTTS) in
Glacier National Park.
Using information ITRR has available through nonresident visitor studies, reports provided by
Glacier National Park (GNP), letters by the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway
Administration (FHA), and discussions with GNP personnel, the following document highlights
the economic impact of the reconstruction project. This report provides a full analysis based on
secondary data. The basis of this report came from the following studies:
1. Duffield, J. (undated). “Estimated Economic Impacts of the Going to the Sun Road
Closure and Reconstruction,” Missoula, MT: Bioeconomics, Inc. This report was an
analysis of the anticipated economic effects of Going-to-the-Sun reconstruction alternatives
as of October 1997. The report concluded that the net regional economic impacts associated
with either of the Going-to-the-Sun road reconstruction alternatives were likely to be
relatively minor.
2. Robert Peccia & Associates, (1997). “Vehicle Movement and Traffic Study Glacier
National Park,” Helena, MT: Robert Peccia & Associates. This report contains two
technical memoranda that evaluate traffic and vehicle movement data collected at Glacier
National Park from August 14 through August 17, 1997. These findings were intended to
provide information for evaluation of the road construction alternatives for Going-to-the-Sun
road.
3. Miller, T. A. & McCool, S. F. (1994). “The Glacier National Park Visitor Use Study,”
Missoula, MT: The University of Montana School of Forestry. This report documents
the characteristics, preferences, motivations and expectations of visitors to Glacier National
Park.
4. Parrish, J., Nickerson, N., & McMahon, K. (1997). “Nonresident Summer Travelers to
Montana: Profiles and Characteristics,” Missoula, MT: Institute for Tourism and
Recreation Research, The University of Montana School of Forestry. This report details
the characteristics and profiles of nonresident summer travelers to the State of Montana.
Included in the study is a comparison of first-time and repeat visitors, primary reasons for
visiting, and travel group comparisons.
5. Nonresident Summer Travelers to Montana attracted to Glacier National Park. This was a
separate analysis conducted using the data from “Nonresident Summer Travelers to
Montana: Profiles and Characteristics” (#4 above). Visitors who indicated they were
attracted to Glacier National Park were grouped and analyzed for this study.
BACKGROUND
The GTTS is deteriorating at an alarming rate. The yearly maintenance of the road has not kept
up with the rate of deterioration, thus GNP is looking into accelerated methods of repairing the
roadway. GNP and the FHA have presented two possible alternatives to the status quo
alternative.
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Accelerated Reconstruction Alternative A
This alternative provides for a 9-10 year construction scenario at a cost of $90-105 million.
Associated with this alternative are a variety of road closures, including night closures, daytime
continuous alternating traffic flow in one lane around construction work sites, full closure after
Labor Day, and limited short-term daytime closures (of approximately 15 minutes) for critical
construction operations. Logan Pass will be accessible June through August to visitors with
hour-long delays to be expected. Essential to this alternative are the following:
•
•
•
•

Full road closures at night all season (9:00 pm to 6:00 am).
Full road closure after Labor Day.
15 minute maximum construction closures during the day.
Continuous alternating traffic flow in one lane at the work site.

Fast-Track Reconstruction Alternative B
This alternative provides for a 4 or 6 year construction scenario at a cost of $70-85 million.
Associated with this alternative is closure from Avalanche Creek to the Pass (west side), and
Siyeh Bend to the Pass (east side). The scenario options used in this report refer to the four-year
construction period as either 2/2 (two-year closure on the west and two-year closure on the east)
or 3/1 (three-year closure on the west and one-year closure on the east). The six-year scenario
options provided in this analysis include 3/3 (three-year closure on the west followed by threeyear closure on the east) and 4/2 (four-year closure on the west followed by two-year closure on
the east). The Pass will be accessible to visitors at all times (discussion with Larry Frederick,
GNP Chief Interpreter, 18, June 1998) . Essential to this alternative are the following:
•
•

Access to Logan Pass from the east while the west side is closed.
Access to Logan Pass from the west while the east side is closed.

No Action/Status Quo Alternative C
If neither alternative A or B is acceptable, or funding does not become available, the No
Action/Status Quo Alternative C would be continued on a piecemeal basis for the next 50 years
at a cost of over $200 million for the entire road system. This alternative does not meet Glacier’s
needs for preserving the integrity of the GTTS. Additionally, this alternative greatly increases
the possibility of immediate road closure for a year or more due to such happenings as a sudden
road slump or wall deterioration, which would make the road inaccessible until extensive repairs
could be made.
ANALYSIS APPROACH
In a simple explanation, methods used to estimate the economic impact of the two reconstruction
alternatives include the following:
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1. Computing the June-September expected visitation counts using a line-of-best-fit (linear
regression) and a re-entry figure (Schedule 3).
2. Applying the percent of nonresident GNP visitors to total Park visitation to generate
nonresident visitation within the Park.
3. Reducing visitation numbers to “visitor” numbers by dividing visitation number by the reentry number.
4. Multiplying expected visitor numbers by the percent drop in visitors depending on
reconstruction scenarios.
5. Computing per-year and total expenditure losses for the Glacier area and for the state.
(Schedule 2).
6. Adding economic “gains” from construction to the expenditure losses (Schedule 2).
7. Importing expenditure losses into IMPLAN to produce statewide economic impacts
(Schedule 4).

Definitions
Visitation:
Visitors:
Re-entries:
Park nonresidents:
Primary attraction:
Secondary attraction:
Glacier Area:

A head count of visitors to the Park without regard to repeated entry by the same person
or group.
Refers to individuals visiting the Park by eliminating multiple entries during a trip
(visitor = visitation/reentry).
The average number of times a visitor enters the Park during a single trip.
Visitors to the Park who reside out-of-state or out-of-country.
Nonresidents to the Park who are in Montana primarily because of the Park (80.65% of
all nonresidents in the Park).
Nonresidents to the Park who are in the Park as a secondary reason for their visit to
Montana (19.35% of all nonresidents in the Park).
Includes St. Mary, Essex, Columbia Falls, Whitefish, East Glacier, West Glacier,
Kalispell, and Waterton.

Assumptions and Decisions
For the analysis of the Accelerated and Fast Track Alternatives, numerous assumptions and
decisions had to be made about the data and time line. This report is based on the following
assumptions or limitations (see schedules 1-6 in Appendix for detailed calculations of visitation
reductions and economic impacts).
Assumptions and Decisions Common to both Alternatives A and B:
1. Overall Park visitation would have grown at historical averages of approximately one percent
per year without reconstruction interference.
2. This study provides an analysis of the economic impact to the state and the Glacier area
provided by nonresidents who visit the Park. The decision to include only nonresidents was
made for three reasons:
• The Peccia (1997) report states that 80.5 percent of visitors to the Park are nonresidents.
• The 20 percent of remaining Park visitors are local residents (10%) or Montana residents
(10%) who spend less time in the Park (2.2 days) and therefore provide a significantly
3

less impact on the local economies. In addition, it is assumed that Montana residents are
more likely to still visit the Park and the area because of their knowledge of other aspects
of the Park not affected by the GTTS reconstruction.
• Current expenditure data of nonresident visitors who go to Glacier National Park are
available from the Institute for Tourism and Recreation Research at The University of
Montana and length of stay of nonresident visitors to the Park is available from the
Peccia (1997) study.
3. 80.65 percent of all nonresidents to the Park are in Montana primarily because of the Park
and 19.35 percent of all nonresidents to the Park are in the Park as a secondary reason for
their visit to Montana (Parrish, Nickerson, & McMahon, 1997)
4. The Peccia (1997) study is the basis for reduction in visitation due to road construction.
5. Re-entry of visitors to the Park is 4.03 times per trip (Schedule 3).
6. Nonresident visitors to the Park stay an average of 3.2 days in the Glacier area (Peccia,
1997).
7. Based on the ITRR data set for nonresidents visiting Montana primarily for GNP, the length
of stay in the state is 5.1 days. With Peccia (1997) reporting average GNP stay for
nonresidents of 3.2 days, it is assumed that nonresidents spend an average of 3.2 days in the
park area and 1.9 days elsewhere in Montana.
8. The negative economic impact due to construction will only be felt during the months of
June through September when Logan Pass is typically accessible.
9. Road construction will begin in 2001. Analysis for this report will continue forward for the
entire time of each alternative. However, GNP has stated that construction will cease or slow
down during the Lewis and Clark Bicentennial Commemoration to reduce impacts to
visitors.
10. Actual construction costs will be at the high end of the estimate.
11. Alternatives A and B actually produce annual savings in terms of NPS funds spent on the
reconstruction. Currently, $2 million from the GNP budget is put into road construction on
GTTS. Under these alternatives, this $2 million would be considered the Status Quo and
only the increases associated with the Alternatives would be considered when measuring the
economic impacts. In short, a $10 million project would actually only cost $8 million in
additional funds.
12. The FHA escalated reconstruction costs to the actual construction years (Letter to Glacier
NPS Superintendent from FHA, Carol Jacoby, dated April 6, 1998).
13. Inflation rate is 3 percent per year during the construction years. This is consistent with FHA
inflation used to compute construction costs.
14. Dollar figures are rounded to the nearest thousand.
15. Trip expenditure dollars are rounded to whole dollars.
16. All figures in this document are reported in dollars for the year stated (then-year $), unless
otherwise indicated.
Assumptions and Decisions for Accelerated Reconstruction Alternative A:
1. This alternative will take 10 years.
2. Logan Pass is always accessible from both sides of the park during the summer months and
closed after Labor Day.
3. Visitation reduction during the months of June - August is 16.53% (See Schedule 3).
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4. Visitation reduction for total closure in September is 37.22% (See Schedule 3).
5. Construction costs are straight-lined (evenly distributed) over the 10-year period.
6. Length of delay to the traveler does not exceed one hour due to construction or changes in
traffic movement.
Assumptions and Decisions for Fast-Track Reconstruction Alternative B:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

This alternative will take 4 or 6 years.
Logan Pass is always accessible (closed on one side while open on the other).
Park visitation reduction per year during west side closure is 30.28% (See Schedule 3).
Park visitation reduction for the east side closure is 23.47% (See Schedule 3).
Construction costs are straight-lined (evenly distributed) across 4 or 6 years.

METHODS AND RESULTS
This section provides the discussion of where the numbers were found and how the numbers
were calculated to determine the impacts of the reconstruction project under each alternative.
Estimating Loss in GNP Visitors Due to Reconstruction
To estimate expected losses in summer visitor numbers, three steps were taken. First, historical
visitation from the last 13 years was analyzed in order to predict (estimate) future visitation.
Second, re-entry rate of visitors was calculated and applied to visitation rates in order to convert
visitation numbers into visitors. Finally, to estimate loss in visitors, results from the Peccia
(1997) questions were incorporated.
Estimating Future Visitation
Summer visitation (June through September) has always represented the largest visitation
numbers to GNP. Historically, summer visitation averages 87.8 percent of annual GNP
visitation based upon the 13-year history, which was provided in the Bioeconomics report. From
the visitation data for the years 1985 through 1997, a line-of-best-fit using regression analysis
was found. From this line, visitation for each year through 2010 was estimated using the
predicted increase of one percent annually (Table 1). The Peccia study found that, historically,
80.5 percent of this visitation originates from outside of Montana.
Table 1
GNP Projected Visitation Numbers Based on Regression Analysis (Without Construction)
Year
Total Visitation
Year
Total Visitation
2001
2,083,151
2006
2,189,317
2002
2,104,384
2007
2,210,550
2003
2,125,617
2008
2,231,783
2004
2,146,850
2009
2,253,017
2005
2,168,084
2010
2,274,250
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Converting ‘Visitation’ to ‘Visitors’
A reentry factor of 4.03 for the summer months of June through September was computed using
data in the Miller and McCool (1994) study. Table 2 provides the calculation. No data was
available to determine differences in the re-entry behavior of residents and nonresidents,
therefore the re-entry number used is based on all summer visitors.
Table 2
Re-Entry Calculations
1993
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Total

Visitation
340,288
626,668
624,559
288,356
1,879,871

Seasonal
Factor*
4.6
4.6
4.6
2.4

Visitors
73,976
136,232
135,774
120,148
466,130

Summer
Reentries

4.03

*Miller & McCool (1994)

Estimating Losses in Visitors
The loss in visitors per year during reconstruction was computed by using the survey results
(Peccia, 1997) of various questions asked of visitors about their anticipated behavior with the
GTTS under construction. The questions used for calculation are presented in Table 3.

Table 3
Glacier National Park - Vehicle Movement Study (Peccia, 1997)*
Q7. If there was a one hour road construction delay in getting across or to Logan Pass, would you still visit
the Park?
No
139 (16.53%) (83.47% will come to the park under this scenario)
Total 841
Q8. If Logan Pass was closed due to road construction would you still visit the park?
No
313 (37.22%) (62.78% will come to the park under this scenario)
Total 841
Q9. If road construction prevented you from traveling across the Pass, but allowed
access to the Pass, would you still visit the Park?
No
157 (18.67%) (81.33% will come to the park under this scenario)
Total 841

*Based on nonresident reponses
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Accelerated Alternative A (10-year scenario) requires one-hour delays from either side of the
Park from June through August, and September closure of the GTTS. Based on the Peccia study
(1997, Q7), 83.47 percent of nonresidents will still come to the park if there was a one-hour
delay. For the September closure, only 62.78 percent of nonresidents will come to the Park if the
pass is closed (Peccia, 1997, Q8). See Schedule 3 for a detailed description of visitor reduction
calculations.
Fast Track Alternative B (4 and 6 year scenarios) allows access to the Pass from one side only.
Based on the Peccia (1997, Q8) study, when the west side is closed, 69.72 percent of nonresident
visitors will still come to the park. When the east side is closed, 74.39 percent of nonresident
visitors will come to the park (Schedule 3).
While concerns have been raised that some people do not use the GTTS and should not be
included in the total number of visitors, no data is available to support this belief, particularly for
the nonresident population. The Peccia (1997) study indicates that 86.4 percent of nonresidents
(Q6) drove ‘over’ Logan Pass. Miller & McCool (1994) concluded that 83.1 percent of all
visitors to the Park (resident and nonresident) drove ‘over’ Logan Pass. This indicates, at a
minimum, that 83 to 86 percent of visitors use the GTTS. It does not include those who drove
“to” Logan Pass, but not “over” the Pass. In addition, the Peccia study (1997), which is the basis
for visitor reduction calculations, never asked the question needed to determine the extent to
which nonresidents would not come to the Park if they had to take a two-hour detour one way
and a two-hour detour back in order to go to the Pass. Therefore, the calculation used for one
side of closure in this study is based on the Peccia (1997) question 8, “ If Logan Pass was closed
due to road construction, would you still visit the park?” Being the “Crown Jewel of the
National Parks,” nonresidents come to GNP to drive the highway. If the Pass is closed from
their side, they will perceive the Pass as closed or inaccessible (Bioeconomics, p.8) and many
will decide not to come to the Park.
Nonresident Visitor Expenditures and Potential Loss
Expenditures of nonresident visitors to Montana are estimated annually by the Institute for
Tourism and Recreation Research. A separate analysis was conducted on the nonresidents who
visit Montana because of GNP. The separation of Glacier visitors from all nonresident visitors
provided more detailed information on the characteristics of Glacier visitors, including length of
stay, expenditures, and group size.
To determine trip expenditures of those nonresident visitors who stated GNP was their primary
attraction to Montana, length of stay (n=1637), visitor group size (n=1660), and daily
expenditure averages (n=1582) for these specific visitors were extracted from ITRR’s
nonresident visitor data set. The average length of stay was 5.1 days and average daily
expenditures per visitor group were $108.33 (1996 dollars). Average visitor group size was 2.75.
Using the inflation factor of 2.3 percent from 1996 to 1997, a per-visitor expenditure of $206 per
trip (1.023 x $108.33 x 5.1 ÷ 2.75) was computed. In 1997 dollars, nonresident GNP visitors
spent $206 per visitor per trip or $566.50 per group per trip in the State of Montana.
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Nonresident visitor reduction to the Park ranges from 71,630 in the first year to 78,200 in the 10th
year for Alternative A. In Alternative B, visitor reduction, depending on the length of closure for
each side, would range from 95,288 in one year to a high of 113,789 in another year (Schedule
3).
After visitation numbers were calculated, direct dollars lost were computed by multiplying
visitor losses by the $206 per trip per visitor expenditure figure. The potential direct loss in
tourism dollars to Montana due to reconstruction of the road ranges from $81 million to $160
million depending on the alternative and the years of reconstruction. The dollars were inflated
(3%) to represent losses in the years represented (Schedule 2).
Example:

visitor expenditure per trip x visitor loss in a given year = direct economic loss in that year
Alt. A year 2001: $206 per visitor per trip x 57,766 loss in visitation = $11,900,000 (1997 $)

For Accelerated Alternative A, the direct loss in visitor expenditures is $161 million over 10
years. Individual business sector impacts are $30 million in lodging, $33 million in gasoline and
oil, $28 million in restaurant and bar, $39 million in retail, and $31 million in other sectors
(Schedule 1).
In the Fast-Track Alternative B, the direct loss in visitor expenditures range from $81 million to
$129 million depending on reconstruction years and side of closure. Individual business sector
impacts are $15 to $24 million in lodging, $14 to $22 million in restaurant and bar, $17 to $27
million in gasoline and oil, $20 to $32 million in retail sales, and $15 to $25 million in other
sectors (Schedules 1 & 2).
Nonresident Statewide Potential Economic Impact
Using nonresident visitor numbers, reduction in visitation due to reconstruction, length of stay in
the state, and expenditures per trip, the total impacts were calculated using the IMPLAN inputoutput economic model for each alternative. Potential total tourism dollar losses to the state
range from $129 million to $258 million (Schedule 2).
Accelerated Reconstruction Alternative A shows total losses of $199 million in output, $63
million in personal income, and 388 jobs lost over the 10-year reconstruction time period in 1997
dollars (Schedule 4). Total impact refers to the direct, indirect, and induced impacts.
Fast-Track Reconstruction Alternative B shows total losses ranging from $110 to $171 million in
output, $35 to $54 million in personal income, and 478 to 487 jobs during the four or six-year
reconstruction time period in 1997 dollars (Schedule 4). Once, again, total impact refers to the
direct, indirect, and induced impacts.
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Estimating Potential Reconstruction Benefits
Measuring the State’s economic benefit from additional reconstruction efforts above those which
are already being experienced is full of uncertainties. The major unknown is to what extent
Montana-owned construction businesses will succeed in winning contracts. A more complete
analysis would contain:
•
•
•
•
•

Information identifying the streams of payments on an annual basis.
Probabilities related to Montana construction participation.
Probabilities of shortened or extended performance.
Probabilities of under-run or overrun budgets.
A determination of whether the newly completed road will draw more visitors to GNP upon
its completion.

In essence, the analysis should consider more economic variables than heretofore considered.
However, many of those figures would not be available until the alternative had already been
chosen and underway. Therefore, while all data is not currently available, this analysis is
conducted with the best available information and assumptions on construction benefits.
A 25 percent Montana construction share was used for this analysis. While historically 100
percent of the construction was awarded to Montana companies, specialized rock wall masonry
skills might require out-of-state contracts (Bioeconomics, Inc., p.iii). Additionally, it can be
argued that the benefit gained will not be in the Glacier area since the Montana construction
companies used in the past have been from Missoula or Billings.
Considering this 25 percent share of construction awarded to Montana companies, the economic
gain to Montana would range from $18 million to $21 million depending on the alternative and
length of construction. With a construction multiplier of 1.57 (Bioeconomics, Inc.), the total
economic gain to the Montana economy would range from $28 million to $33 million (Schedule
2).
Losses and Gains Combined for the Total Economic Impact
Even with construction gains to offset losses related to tourism, there will still be a net economic
loss for the state of Montana (Schedule 2, Table 5). In addition, the “winners” and “losers”
during the reconstruction efforts are not likely to be the same people. In other words, the
economic gains in construction will be felt in a different place by different people than the
economic losses associated with the downturn in tourism.
With the realistic assumption that Montana-owned construction contractors will obtain 25
percent of the planned effort, the net total economic impact is as follows:
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Table 5
Total Economic Impact (Output) to Montana (Construction Gain, Tourism Loss)*
Reconstruction Accelerated Alternative A
Construction Industry Output Gains
Tourism Industry Output Losses
Net Gain (Loss) from Reconstruction
Reconstruction Fast Track Alternative B
4 year construction period:

$ 33,050,000
(257,778,000)
$(224,728,000)

2/2 scenario

Construction Industry Output
$ 29,940,000
Tourism Industry Output Losses
(29,226,000 )
Net Gain (Loss) from Reconstruction $( 99,286,000)
6 year construction period:

3/1 scenario
$ 29,940,000
$(134,747,0000
$(104,807,000)

3/3 scenario

Construction Industry Output
$ 28,386,000
Tourism Industry Output Losses
(201,571,000)
Net Gain (Loss) from Reconstruction $(173,185,000)

4/2 scenario
$

28,386,000
(207,316,000)
$(178,930,000)

*Dollars for the year stated (then-year $) (Schedule 2)
Discounting Cash Flows
Discounting cash flows is a process used in investment decision making. Discounting refers to
the condition where a dollar in the future has less value than a dollar today. The process
involves expressing cash flows to a single value at a specific time in order to compare varying
cash flows over varying periods of time. The discount assumption used was 7 percent per year.
This is the number recommended for government expenditures by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). This discount assumption is likely not to be the same as the internal rate of
return used by the businesses affected by this decision.
Considering the discounting process, Accelerated Reconstruction Alternative A is expected to
have a negative net present value of $165 million in the year 2001 compared to $225 million if
not discounted. Fast-Track Alternative B is expected to have a negative net present value
ranging from $90 million to $152 million compared to $99 million and $179 million if not
discounted. The discounting process narrows the margin between the investment alternatives. In
other words, without discounting, Alternative A is $46 million more expensive than Fast-Track
Alternative B 4/2 scenario, but only $13 million more expensive when discounting is considered
(Schedule 2).
Looking only at discounted figures in making investment decisions is risky, as it does not
consider cash flow requirements on an annual basis. While discounting is useful to the National
Park Service in the decision process for reconstruction alternatives, these numbers do not show
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the connection of local businesses to their cash flow concerns. In other words, discounting is
important in the Park investment, but not necessarily for the local businesses.
Glacier Area Potential Direct Tourism Dollar Loss.
The Glacier area refers to St. Mary, Essex, Columbia Falls, Whitefish, East and West Glacier,
Kalispell and Waterton as reported in Peccia, 1997, Q2. To compute the potential loss to just the
Glacier area, the following calculation was made:
nonresident visitor loss*
x
visitor expenditure per trip
x
(length of stay in Glacier area/ divided by length of stay in Montana)**
= Glacier area economic loss
Example - Alternative A, year 2001: 71,630 x $206 x 3.2/5.1 = $9,258,529 (1997 dollars)
* The nonresident visitor loss figures used for the Glacier area consider both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ visitors
since all the Park visitors are in the Glacier area. This differs from statewide loss figures since the ‘secondary’
visitors would still come to Montana.
**Because the length of stay in Glacier is shorter than the length of stay in Montana, the visitors’ percent of time in
the area needs to be incorporated into the equation.

The direct tourism dollar loss to the Glacier area, using the calculation above for each year and
each alternative, is estimated to be $63 million to $125 million (Table 4) (Schedule 2). This
analysis assumes no direct positive impact from construction on the Glacier area.
Table 4
Potential Direct Tourism Dollar Loss to the Glacier Area
current year (then-year $)*
Accelerated Alternative A (9-10) year scenario
$125
Fast Track Alternative B
4 years: west side closed 2 years, east side closed 2 years
$ 63
4 years: west side closed 3 years, east side closed 1 year
$ 65
6 years: west side closed 3 years, east side closed 3 years
6 years: west side closed 4 years, east side closed 2 years

$ 98
$101

*millions of dollars

Final Observation
It is estimated (FHA letter by Jacoby to GNP Superintendent dated April 6, 1998) that No
Action/Status Quo Alternative C would take 47 years and up to $215 million. If it is reasonable
to assume that no road repair will occur on GTTS for the 40 year period following completion
under Alternative B, then the Park will realize a $130 million savings by doing the fast-track
alternative rather than Alternative C. If it was performed under the option 2/2 scenario, then this
$130 million savings that the Park would realize is actually borne by the local businesses and the
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State of Montana in the amount of $81 million or 62 percent of the Park savings. In other words,
while the Park may save $130 million, the local and state economy loses $81 million. This
consideration, however, does not estimate the potential gain to be realized by businesses after the
reconstruction is completed.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a brief summary followed by conclusions based on the data provided. The
recommendations are the same for Alternative A or B in the case that one of those Alternatives is
chosen for the reconstruction effort.
Summary
Reconstruction alternatives A and B carry potential net losses to the State’s economy in amounts
ranging from $99 million to $225 million including construction gains. Total output (direct,
indirect, and induced impacts related to tourism) nonresident tourism dollars lost to the state
range from $129 million to $258 million.
Annual visitation declines of 17 to 36 percent will be experienced under reconstruction
alternative A and declines of 23 to 29 percent will be experienced under reconstruction
alternative B. These declines reach nearly double the highest single-year decline experienced
over the past 13 years of Park visitation. The sustained decline in Park visitation that will be
experienced under either alternative has no parallel in GNP’s recent history and probably
unparalleled since its establishment as a national park.
The majority of these potential direct losses will be felt by the local communities. The Glacier
area direct tourism loss will range from $63 million to $125 million over the reconstruction time
periods. From a cash flow standpoint, many businesses will experience difficulties and some
may be unable to survive without a plan to offset or minimize the loss.
Conclusions
This analysis of secondary data, including data that were not available when the first economic
impact report was produced (Bioeconomics, Inc.), provides further understanding of the local
and statewide impacts. It was performed to determine whether additional GNP visitor studies
should be conducted to clarify the economic impact of the GTTS reconstruction alternatives
being contemplated. While additional studies might refine the findings of this study, it is
unlikely that different conclusions regarding the significance of the economic impact will be
materially changed by another study. While this study does not get down to the county level, it
is believed, based on the enormous impact demonstrated here to the Glacier area, that further
detail at the county level is not necessary. Therefore, based on this analysis, it is recommended
that further primary data collection is not necessary.

In comparing the Alternatives being considered for the reconstruction effort, a number of
observations can be made about the economic impacts.
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1. Annual losses between the Alternatives would point to Alternative A since these are lower
then the annual losses in Alternative B.
2. The duration of losses would suggest that Alternative B is a better choice simply because the
impact is over a shorter time period.
3. From the standpoint of pure “bottom-line” impact, Alternative B, 2/2 scenario provides the
least total loss to the Montana and Glacier Area economy when alternative C is not
considered.
4. Alternative C, “status quo,” appears to have no economic impact, but the ‘risk’ associated
with this Alternative may ultimately result in a higher economic cost.
5. The potential to mitigate the economic impact through marketing opportunities under
Alternatives A and B could substantially reduce the impact predicted in this report.
The above discussion involves only the economic consideration of reconstruction of the GTTS.
While this study was not meant to look at the social side of the issue, it is important to note that
social concerns or opportunities could assist in the decision process. For example, with
discounting added into the decision process, Alternative A is marginally more expensive than
Alternative B 4/2 but provides a greater opportunity for mitigating the losses, i.e. through
marketing the experience of the reconstruction to the potential Park visitor. In Alternative A, the
visitor still has the opportunity to see and experience the reconstruction by driving the entire
road. On the other hand, the shortened length of reconstruction time in Alternative B, may be
less of an overall impact on the visitor. Finally, Alternative C may have negative impact on
visitation over time when there is perpetual construction occurring in the Park.
Both reconstruction Alternatives A and B will have a significant cost impact on Montana’s
economy with the majority of the impact being borne by the local communities who have
supported GNP visitor needs in the past. The No Action/Status Quo Alternative, while always
an option to consider, is risky since unexpected closure due to road failures could occur at
anytime. Alternatives A and B hopefully provide enough lead-time for businesses to plan, rather
than risking a financial burden or failure.
It is concluded, therefore, that no one individual should make the choice of reconstruction
alternatives for the GTTS. This analysis only provides the economic picture. The Park needs to
look at the impact to the businesses, the visitors, and the environment.
Recommendations
If either Alternative A or B become the reconstruction choice, it is recommended that a team of
local business people and Park personnel start a process of investigating what should be done to
minimize the impact. In order to be successful, this process might need a facilitator to guide the
discussion and assist the group in moving forward. The group should be responsible for looking
at all possible options. No potential option should be left out of the discussion! Some of the
following ideas could be looked into as possibilities:
•

Identify the “Greater Glacier Park Area” as the place to see rather than just the Park.
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•
•
•
•

Improve the infrastructure of other Park areas which may be impacted with increased
visitation during construction.
Hire a reputable public relations firm for direction and present a unified message of the Park
Create an awareness of other areas in and around the Park.
Use the construction as an historical event that people should come see - slogan could be
“See history being made - Again!” For example: Provide bus tours or walking interpretive
tours that can view the construction site and discuss a comparison of the road being built
initially and the reconstruction process being taken now.

Some of these ideas and others to be generated may provide a start for dealing with the
reconstruction time period. If the Park and the Glacier area businesses work together on a
proactive approach to decreasing the potential loss in visitation, the actual economic loss could
be minimized. In fact, could it be possible that more people want to come to see the Park at a
unique time in history?
While ideas can be discussed individually, it is of the utmost importance that Park personnel and
business people agree on the plans. For example, too many visitors to a new area in the Park
could be a devastating impact. All plans would need in-depth review to determine positive and
negative impacts.
Therefore, it is recommended that a Reconstruction Survival Marketing Plan be designed and
implemented to overcome the potential economic loss. The plan needs to be the result of a
cooperative effort of Glacier National Park personnel and representatives from all possible
agencies and affected businesses in the Glacier area as well as the state. This cooperative effort
needs to commence immediately.
If the No Action/Status Quo Alternative is the alternative of choice, no further action is needed.
However, businesses and agencies within the tourism industry sector need to be prepared for
continual construction in the Park and the possibility of a major immediate closure.
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APPENDIX A - SCHEDULE WORKSHEETS
Schedule 1 - Nonresident Direct Expenditure Losses: Allocation to Business Sectors
Schedule 2 - Losses and Gains
Schedule 3 - Visitation Losses
Schedule 4 - Decreases to Direct, Indirect and Induced, and Output due to Tourism
Economic Losses
Schedule 5 - Increases to Output due to Construction Economic Gains
Schedule 6 - Factors and Values for Measurement of Economic Impacts
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Schedule 1
Page 1 of 2
SCHEDULE OF NONRESIDENT DIRECT EXPENDITURE LOSSES
ALLOCATION TO BUSINESS SECTORS (note 1)
GLACIER NATIONAL PARK RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT ALTERNATIVES
for GOING-TO-THE-SUN ROAD
(Amounts rounded to nearest thousand in then-year dollars)

Year
(note 2)

Hotel,
Lodge,
& B&B
(note 3)

Gasoline
& Oil
(note 3)

Restaurant
& Bar
(note 3)

Retail
Sales
(note 3)

Other
(note 3)

Total
Direct
Losses
(Schedule 2)

ALTERNATIVE A: ACCELERATED PROJECT LOSSES
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

$2,505,000 $2,759,000 $2,304,000 $3,268,000 $2,558,000 $13,394,000
2,606,000
2,871,000
2,397,000
3,400,000
2,662,000
13,936,000
2,711,000
2,987,000
2,494,000
3,538,000
2,769,000
14,499,000
2,820,000
3,107,000
2,594,000
3,680,000
2,881,000
15,082,000
2,934,000
3,232,000
2,699,000
3,828,000
2,997,000
15,690,000
3,051,000
3,361,000
2,807,000
3,981,000
3,117,000
16,317,000
3,173,000
3,496,000
2,919,000
4,141,000
3,241,000
16,970,000
3,300,000
3,635,000
3,035,000
4,306,000
3,371,000
17,647,000
3,431,000
3,780,000
3,156,000
4,477,000
3,505,000
18,349,000
3,568,000
3,930,000
3,281,000
4,655,000
3,644,000
19,078,000
$30,099,000 $33,158,000 $27,686,000 $39,274,000 $30,745,000 $160,962,000
ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 2/2 LOSSES (note 1)

2001
2002
2003
2004

$3,861,000 $4,253,000 $3,551,000 $5,037,000 $3,943,000
4,017,000
4,425,000
3,695,000
5,241,000
4,103,000
3,535,000
3,894,000
3,251,000
4,612,000
3,610,000
3,677,000
4,051,000
3,382,000
4,798,000
3,756,000
$15,090,000 $16,623,000 $13,879,000 $19,688,000 $15,412,000

$20,645,000
21,481,000
18,902,000
19,664,000
$80,692,000

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/1 LOSSES (note 1)
2001
2002
2003
2004

$3,861,000 $4,253,000 $3,551,000 $5,037,000 $3,943,000
4,017,000
4,425,000
3,695,000
5,241,000
4,103,000
4,179,000
4,604,000
3,844,000
5,453,000
4,269,000
3,677,000
4,051,000
3,382,000
4,798,000
3,756,000
$15,734,000 $17,333,000 $14,472,000 $20,529,000 $16,071,000

$20,645,000
21,481,000
22,349,000
19,664,000
$84,139,000

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/3 LOSSES (note 1)
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

$3,861,000 $4,253,000 $3,551,000 $5,037,000 $3,943,000 $20,645,000
4,017,000
4,425,000
3,695,000
5,241,000
4,103,000
21,481,000
4,179,000
4,604,000
3,844,000
5,453,000
4,269,000
22,349,000
3,677,000
4,051,000
3,382,000
4,798,000
3,756,000
19,664,000
3,825,000
4,213,000
3,518,000
4,991,000
3,907,000
20,454,000
3,978,000
4,382,000
3,659,000
5,191,000
4,063,000
21,273,000
$23,537,000 $25,928,000 $21,649,000 $30,711,000 $24,041,000 $125,866,000
ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 4/2 LOSSES (note 1)

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

$3,861,000 $4,253,000 $3,551,000 $5,037,000 $3,943,000 $20,645,000
4,017,000
4,425,000
3,695,000
5,241,000
4,103,000
21,481,000
4,179,000
4,604,000
3,844,000
5,453,000
4,269,000
22,349,000
4,348,000
4,790,000
3,999,000
5,673,000
4,441,000
23,251,000
3,825,000
4,213,000
3,518,000
4,991,000
3,907,000
20,454,000
3,978,000
4,382,000
3,659,000
5,191,000
4,063,000
21,273,000
$24,208,000 $26,667,000 $22,266,000 $31,586,000 $24,726,000 $129,453,000

SCHEDULE 1
Page 2 of 2

EXPLANATORY NOTES:
1.
Amounts are presented in “then-year” dollars for each alternative and for the options in
Alternative B. “Then-year” is defined as the year in which the costs are expected to be incurred.
The options for Alternative B are denoted as 2/2, 3/1, 3/3, and 4/2. The first number in each of
these pairs is the number of years in which the construction is performed on the west side of
Logan Pass. The second number refers to the construction years of performance on the east side
of Logan Pass.
2.
As requested by NPS, years of performance are presented in consecutive years. NPS has
indicated that the reconstruction effort will be delayed during the celebration of the Lewis &
Clark Expedition bicentennial. Computations to then-year dollars and discounting to 1997
dollars would be affected if the delay in performance was known. However, the relative dollar
impacts between tourism losses and construction gains should not be significantly affected.
3.
Allocation of direct expenditure losses to business sectors were determined from ITRR’s
nonresident traveler survey (1997) data. In our survey, we found that Hotel, Lodge, and Bed &
Breakfasts receive 18.7 percent, Gasoline and Oil related businesses receive 20.6 percent,
Restaurant and Bar businesses receive 17.2 percent, Retail Sale businesses receive 24.4 percent,
and all Other businesses receive 19.1 percent of the nonresident traveler expenditures.
Businesses represented in Other include, among others, campgrounds, R.V. parks, auto rental,
transportation, and grocery stores.
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SCHEDULE OF LOSSES AND GAINS
GLACIER NATIONAL PARK RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT ALTERNATIVES
for GOING-TO-THE-SUN ROAD

Nonres.
Visitor
Loss
Year (Schedule 3)

LOSSES IN TOURISM DOLLARS
(amounts are in then-year dollars)
Primary
Nonres.
Glacier Area Losses
Visitor
Montana Direct Losses
(97 Dollars)
(Then-Year $)
Loss
(97 Dollars)
(Then-Year $)
(note 1)
(note 2)
(note 3)
(note 4)
(note 5)

Montana
Total
Impact
(Then-Year $)
(note 6)

ALTERNATIVE A: ACCELERATED PROJECT LOSSES
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

71,630
72,360
73,089
73,819
74,549
75,280
76,010
76,740
77,470
78,200

$9,259,000
9,353,000
9,447,000
9,541,000
9,636,000
9,730,000
9,825,000
9,919,000
10,013,000
10,108,000
$96,831,000

$10,421,000
10,843,000
11,280,000
11,734,000
12,207,000
12,695,000
13,204,000
13,730,000
14,276,000
14,844,000
$125,234,000

57,766
58,355
58,943
59,531
60,120
60,710
61,298
61,887
62,476
63,065

$11,900,000
12,021,000
12,142,000
12,263,000
12,385,000
12,506,000
12,627,000
12,749,000
12,870,000
12,991,000
$124,454,000

$13,394,000
13,936,000
14,498,000
15,082,000
15,689,000
16,317,000
16,970,000
17,648,000
18,350,000
19,078,000
$160,962,000

$21,450,000
22,318,000
23,218,000
24,154,000
25,126,000
26,132,000
27,177,000
28,263,000
29,387,000
30,553,000
$257,778,000

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 2/2 LOSSES
2001
2002
2003
2004

110,413
111,538
95,288
96,240

$14,271,000
14,417,000
12,316,000
12,439,000
$53,443,000

$16,062,000
16,713,000
14,706,000
15,298,000
$62,779,000

89,043
89,950
76,845
77,613

$18,343,000
18,530,000
15,830,000
15,988,000
$68,691,000

$20,645,000
21,481,000
18,902,000
19,663,000
$80,691,000

$33,063,000
34,402,000
30,271,000
31,490,000
$129,226,000

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/1 LOSSES
2001
2002
2003
2004

110,413
111,538
112,664
96,240

$14,271,000
14,417,000
14,562,000
12,439,000
$55,689,000

$16,062,000
16,713,000
17,388,000
15,298,000
$65,461,000

89,043
89,950
90,858
77,613

$18,343,000
18,530,000
18,717,000
15,988,000
$71,578,000

$20,645,000
21,481,000
22,349,000
19,663,000
$84,138,000

$33,063,000
34,402,000
35,792,000
31,490,000
$134,747,000

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/3 LOSSES
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

110,413
111,538
112,664
96,240
97,192
98,143

$14,271,000
14,417,000
14,562,000
12,439,000
12,563,000
12,685,000
$80,937,000

$16,062,000
16,713,000
17,388,000
15,298,000
15,914,000
16,551,000
$97,926,000

89,043
89,950
90,858
77,613
78,381
79,148

$18,343,000
18,530,000
18,717,000
15,988,000
16,146,000
16,304,000
$104,028,000

$20,645,000
21,481,000
22,349,000
19,663,000
20,453,000
21,273,000
$125,864,000

$33,063,000
34,402,000
35,792,000
31,490,000
32,755,000
34,069,000
$201,571,000

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 4/2 LOSSES
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

110,413
111,538
112,664
113,789
97,192
98,143

$14,271,000
14,417,000
14,562,000
14,708,000
12,563,000
12,685,000
$83,206,000

$16,062,000
16,713,000
17,388,000
18,089,000
15,914,000
16,551,000
$100,717,000

89,043
89,950
90,858
91,765
78,381
79,148

$18,343,000
18,530,000
18,717,000
18,904,000
16,146,000
16,304,000
$106,944,000

$20,645,000
21,481,000
22,349,000
23,250,000
20,453,000
21,273,000
$129,451,000

$33,063,000
34,402,000
35,792,000
37,235,000
32,755,000
34,069,000
$207,316,000
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SCHEDULE OF LOSSES AND GAINS

GAINS IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECT DOLLARS
(amounts are in then-year dollars)
Total
Annual
Montana's Share
Economic
Expenditures
%
Dollars
Impact
(note 7)
(note 8)
(note 9)
(note 10)

NET GAIN/(LOSS)
Discounted $
Then-Year $
to Yr. 2001
(note 11)
(note 12)

ALTERNATIVE A: ACCELERATED PROJECT
$8,500,000
8,500,000
8,500,000
8,500,000
8,500,000
8,500,000
8,500,000
8,500,000
8,500,000
8,500,000
$85,000,000

25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%

$2,125,000
2,125,000
2,125,000
2,125,000
2,125,000
2,125,000
2,125,000
2,125,000
2,125,000
2,125,000
$21,250,000

$3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
$33,050,000

($18,145,000)
(19,013,000)
(19,913,000)
(20,849,000)
(21,821,000)
(22,827,000)
(23,872,000)
(24,958,000)
(26,082,000)
(27,248,000)
($224,728,000)

(18,145,000)
(17,769,000)
(17,393,000)
(17,019,000)
(16,647,000)
(16,275,000)
(15,907,000)
(15,543,000)
(15,180,000)
(14,821,000)
($164,699,000)

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 2/2
$19,250,000
19,250,000
19,250,000
19,250,000
$77,000,000

25%
25%
25%
25%

$4,813,000
4,813,000
4,813,000
4,813,000
$19,252,000

$7,485,000
7,485,000
7,485,000
7,485,000
$29,940,000

($25,578,000)
(26,917,000)
(22,786,000)
(24,005,000)
($99,286,000)

($25,578,000)
(25,156,000)
(19,902,000)
(19,595,000)
($90,231,000)

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/1
$19,250,000
19,250,000
19,250,000
19,250,000
$77,000,000

25%
25%
25%
25%

$4,813,000
4,813,000
4,813,000
4,813,000
$19,252,000

$7,485,000
7,485,000
7,485,000
7,485,000
$29,940,000

($25,578,000)
(26,917,000)
(28,307,000)
(24,005,000)
($104,807,000)

($25,578,000)
(25,156,000)
(24,724,000)
(19,595,000)
($95,053,000)

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/3
$12,167,000
12,167,000
12,167,000
12,167,000
12,167,000
12,167,000
$73,002,000

25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%

$3,042,000
3,042,000
3,042,000
3,042,000
3,042,000
3,042,000
$18,252,000

$4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
$28,386,000

($28,332,000)
(29,671,000)
(31,061,000)
(26,759,000)
(28,024,000)
(29,338,000)
($173,185,000)

($28,332,000)
(27,730,000)
(27,130,000)
(21,843,000)
(21,379,000)
(20,918,000)
($147,332,000)

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 4/2
$12,167,000
12,167,000
12,167,000
12,167,000
12,167,000
12,167,000
$73,002,000

25%
25%
25%
25%
25%
25%

$3,042,000
3,042,000
3,042,000
3,042,000
3,042,000
3,042,000
$18,252,000

$4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
$28,386,000

($28,332,000)
(29,671,000)
(31,061,000)
(32,504,000)
(28,024,000)
(29,338,000)
($178,930,000)

($28,332,000)
(27,730,000)
(27,130,000)
(26,533,000)
(21,379,000)
(20,918,000)
($152,022,000)
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EXPLANATORY NOTES:
1.

Glacier Area Direct Losses (1997 dollars)

Losses to the Glacier area were measured by multiplying the nonresident visitor loss by
the visitor expenditures per trip and then multiplying this product by the ratio of the days in
Glacier to the days in Montana. For nonresidents who visit Glacier, the average per visitor
expenditures are $206 per trip (1997 dollars) and the average length of stay in Montana is 5.1
days. These amounts were calculated from the data in ITRR’s nonresident traveler study
(Parrish, Nickerson, and McMahon, 1997). According to the Peccia (1997) study, nonresidents
spend an average of 3.2 days in the Glacier area. The ratio of days in Glacier to days in Montana
represents the portion of the Glacier trip which impacts Glacier area businesses.
Example (Alt. A, year 2001):
2.

71,630 × $206 ×

3.2
= $9,258,529
5.1

Glacier Area Direct Losses (Then-Year Dollars)

Amounts represent 1997 dollars escalated to performance year dollars using an inflation
rate assumption of three percent per year.
3.

Primary Nonresident Visitor Losses

Of all nonresident visitors to Glacier, 80.65 percent are in Montana primarily to visit
Glacier. These visitors are the ones most likely not to come to Montana at all when the Goingto-the-Sun road is closed or contains delays while under construction. The other nonresident
visitors to Glacier (19.35 percent) will not visit the park under these conditions but will still visit
Montana since they were “primarily” attracted to Montana by something other than Glacier even
though they visited the park during their trip. These latter visitors represent an economic loss to
the Glacier area businesses but would not likely represent a loss to the State of Montana as a
whole (also see note 1 above).
The factor of 80.65 percent was computed by dividing the percent of nonresident visitors
who identified Glacier as their primary attraction (25% of vacationers) by the percent of
nonresident visitors who identified Glacier as one of their attractions, but not their primary, to
Montana (31% of vacationers). These percentages were determined from ITRR’s nonresident
traveler study (Parrish, Nickerson, and McMahon, 1997).
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4.

Montana Direct Losses (1997 Dollars)

Amounts represent the average per-visitor trip expenditure multiplied by the loss in
primary nonresident visitors.
Example (Alt. A year 2001):
5.

$206/trip × 57,766 = $11,899,796

Montana Direct Losses (Then-Year Dollars)

Amounts represent 1997 dollars escalated to performance year dollars using an inflation
rate assumption of three percent per year.
6.

Montana Total Impacts

Amounts represent the total economic loss to the State of Montana as a result of the drop
in nonresident expenditures. For every $100,000 in sales in travel related industries, the
IMPLAN model for Montana shows another $60,000 in indirect and induced sales across the
Montana economy.
7.

Annual Expenditures

Construction annual expenditures were determined by dividing the high end of the
expected total reconstruction costs by the number of years of performance and then subtracting
the current program spending level of $2 million. The Federal Highway Administration
estimated
construction expenditures at $90 to $105 million for Alternative A and $70 to $85 million for
Alternative B. Annual expenditures are in then-year dollars according to NPS documents.
Current spending levels of $2 million are subtracted from the annual project costs to
determine the net increase in construction costs due to the accelerated and fast-track alternatives.
This subtraction is necessary so that the investment decision reflects only the changes to the
current program. A more complete cost impact analysis would consider additional savings to the
fast-track alternative through the remaining years of completion under the accelerated
alternative. These estimates were not available due to the time constraints of this report. It is
anticipated that such savings would increase the acceptance of the fast-track alternative over the
accelerated alternative from the viewpoint of the National Park Service. It is also anticipated that
these same savings would not alter the viewpoint of the tourism business owners regarding the
acceptance of the alternatives.
Example: (Alt. A) $105,000,000 / 10 - $2,000,000 = $8,500,000
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8.

Montana’s Share Percentage

A conservative perspective was adopted regarding the percentage of contracts (25
percent) awarded to Montana-owned construction companies. The Bioeconomics report was
utilized as a source for this assumption.
9.

Montana’s Share Dollars

Amounts are annual expenditures multiplied by the participation percentage of 25
percent.
10.

Output Multiplier

Amounts represent the total economic gain to the State of Montana as a result of the
increase in construction expenditures in the State during the periods of performance. The
multiplier is from the IMPLAN modeling program as reported in the Bioeconomics report.
11.

Net Gain / (Loss)

Amounts represent the difference between the output gains and output losses due the
investment decisions in the accelerated and fast-track alternatives.
12.

Discounted Dollars to 2001

In order to compare the value of these investment decisions having cash streams of
varying levels over differing periods of time, discounting the cash streams is necessary.
Amounts
were discounted to the year 2001 since this is the initial year of performance under each
alternative. The discounting assumption is 7 percent based upon that used in the Bioeconomics
report and used in Government modeling as identified in OMB Circular 94-A. This discount
assumption is not necessarily the same as the internal rate of return used by businesses affected
by the reconstruction decisions.
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SCHEDULE OF VISITATION LOSSES
GLACIER NATIONAL PARK RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT ALTERNATIVES
for GOING-TO-THE-SUN ROAD
ALTERNATIVE A: ACCELERATED PROJECT

Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Remaining
Visitation
Jun-Aug
Sept
(note 1) (note 1)
83.47% 62.78%
83.47% 62.78%
83.47% 62.78%
83.47% 62.78%
83.47% 62.78%
83.47% 62.78%
83.47% 62.78%
83.47% 62.78%
83.47% 62.78%
83.47% 62.78%

Year

Visitation without Construction
Annual
Jun-Sept
Jun-Aug September
(note 2)
(note 3)
(note 3)
(note 3)
2,083,151 1,825,465 1,550,733
274,732
2,104,384 1,844,072 1,566,539
277,533
2,125,617 1,862,678 1,582,345
280,333
2,146,850 1,881,285 1,598,152
283,133
2,168,084 1,899,892 1,613,958
285,934
2,189,317 1,918,498 1,629,764
288,734
2,210,550 1,937,105 1,645,571
291,534
2,231,783 1,955,712 1,661,377
294,335
2,253,017 1,974,318 1,677,183
297,135
2,274,250 1,992,925 1,692,990
299,935

Visitors Willing to
Visit by Entrance
West
East
(note7)
(note7)

Visitation Loss from Construction
Jun-Aug September
Total
(note 4)
(note 4)
(note 4)
256,336
102,255
358,591
258,949
103,298
362,247
261,562
104,340
365,902
264,175
105,382
369,557
266,787
106,425
373,212
269,400
107,467
376,867
272,013
108,509
380,522
274,626
109,551
384,177
277,238
110,594
387,832
279,851
111,636
391,487

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK PROJECT
Entrance Percentage Remaining
Jun-Sept
Jun-Sept
of Total
Visitation
Visitation Visitation
West
East
% of Total Bef. Const.
Losses
(note 8)
(note 8)
(note 9)
(note 3)
(note 4)

Visitor
Loss
(note 5)

Total
Visitor
Loss
(note 5)
88,981
89,888
90,794
91,701
92,608
93,515
94,422
95,329
96,236
97,143

Nonres.
Visitor
Loss
(note 6)

OPTION 2/2
2001
2002
2003
2004

62.78%
62.78%
81.33%
81.33%

81.33%
81.33%
62.78%
62.78%

62.59%
62.59%
62.59%
62.59%

37.41%
37.41%
37.41%
37.41%

69.72%
69.72%
74.39%
74.39%

1,825,465
1,844,072
1,862,678
1,881,285

552,751
558,385
477,032
481,797

137,159
138,557
118,370
119,553

110,413
111,538
95,288
96,240

1,825,465
1,844,072
1,862,678
1,881,285

552,751
558,385
564,019
481,797

137,159
138,557
139,955
119,553

110,413
111,538
112,664
96,240

1,825,465
1,844,072
1,862,678
1,881,285
1,899,892
1,918,498

552,751
558,385
564,019
481,797
486,562
491,327

137,159
138,557
139,955
119,553
120,735
121,917

110,413
111,538
112,664
96,240
97,192
98,143

1,825,465
1,844,072
1,862,678
1,881,285
1,899,892
1,918,498

552,751
558,385
564,019
569,653
486,562
491,327

137,159
138,557
139,955
141,353
120,735
121,917

110,413
111,538
112,664
113,789
97,192
98,143

OPTION 3/1
2001
2002
2003
2004

62.78%
62.78%
62.78%
81.33%

81.33%
81.33%
81.33%
62.78%

62.59%
62.59%
62.59%
62.59%

37.41%
37.41%
37.41%
37.41%

69.72%
69.72%
69.72%
74.39%

OPTION 3/3
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

62.78%
62.78%
62.78%
81.33%
81.33%
81.33%

81.33%
81.33%
81.33%
62.78%
62.78%
62.78%

62.59%
62.59%
62.59%
62.59%
62.59%
62.59%

37.41%
37.41%
37.41%
37.41%
37.41%
37.41%

69.72%
69.72%
69.72%
74.39%
74.39%
74.39%

OPTION 4/2
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

62.78%
62.78%
62.78%
62.78%
81.33%
81.33%

81.33%
81.33%
81.33%
81.33%
62.78%
62.78%

62.59%
62.59%
62.59%
62.59%
62.59%
62.59%

37.41%
37.41%
37.41%
37.41%
37.41%
37.41%

69.72%
69.72%
69.72%
69.72%
74.39%
74.39%

Nonres.
Visitor
Loss
(note 6)
71,630
72,360
73,089
73,819
74,549
75,280
76,010
76,740
77,470
78,200
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EXPLANATORY NOTES:
1.

Remaining Visitation

June through August and September visitation percentages represent the percentage of
nonresident visitors who will or may visit Glacier if road construction delays occur (83.47%) or
if Logan Pass is closed (62.78%). These percentages were developed from nonresidents
responses to the Peccia survey question no. 7 and 8, respectively. The following table presents
the results of the Peccia survey for nonresident negative responses. Percentages in the schedule
are the complement of the negative responses, i.e. (100.00% - 16.53% = 83.47%) and (100.00% 37.22% = 62.78%).
Question no. 7:
If there was a one hour road construction delay in getting across or to Logan Pass, would you
still visit the Park?

Response
No
Total
Percent No

Other US
93
652
14.3%

Local
Canadian
35
118
29.7%

Other nonUS
11
71
15.5%

Totals
139
841
16.53%

Question no. 8:
If Logan Pass was closed due to road construction, would you still visit the Park?

Response
No
Total
Percent No
2.

Other US
241
652
37.0%

Local
Canadian
52
118
44.1%

Other nonUS
20
71
28.2%

Totals
313
841
37.22%

Annual Visitation without Construction

Amounts represent the expected annual visitation based upon a line-of-best-fit regression
analysis applied to the actual visitation numbers for the years 1985 through 1997. The analysis
shows an approximate increase in visitation of one percent per year. Historical visitation
numbers were taken from the Bioeconomics report.
SCHEDULE 3
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3.

Period Visitation before Construction

Amounts represent the 13-year historical percentage of visitation during the years 1985
through 1997 for the seasonal periods indicated in the schedule and applied to the annual
visitation numbers discussed in note 2 above.
4.

Visitation Loss from Construction
Amounts are extended from the results discussed in notes 1 and 3.

5.

Total Visitor Loss

Total visitor loss is visitation loss divided by the average number of reentries for visitors
during the months June through September. Reentries were determined from Miller and McCool
(1994) as follows.

Month
June
July
August
September
Totals
6.

1993 Visitation
340,288
626,668
624,559
288,356
1,879,871

Reentries per
Trip
4.6
4.6
4.6
2.4

Visitors
73,976
136,232
135,774
120,148
466,130

Average
Summer
Reentries

4.03

Nonresident Visitor Loss

Amounts are 80.5 percent of total visitor loss (see note 5 above). Nonresidents represent
approximately 80.5 percent of all visitors to Glacier during the summer months (Peccia, 1997).
Montana residents are excluded from the measurement of the cost impact as discussed under the
assumptions of this report.
7.

Visitors Willing to Visit by Entrance

Under the fast-track options, one side of Logan Pass will be always be closed during each
year of road reconstruction. Since not all visitors can stay on the open side of the road, we
distributed the closed-side and open-side visitors according to the direction from which they
would enter Glacier. Those who would enter from the closed side are less likely to come
(62.78% - see note 1 above) than those who would enter from the open side (81.33 %). The
open-side visitor percentages were determined in manner consistent with that discussed in note 1
above as follows.
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Question no. 9:
If road construction prevented you from traveling across [Logan] Pass, but allowed access to the
Pass, would you still visit the Park?

Response
No
Total
Percent No

Other US
114
652
17.5%

Local
Canadian
34
118
28.8%

Other nonUS
9
71
12.7%

Totals
157
841
18.67%

Visitors willing to come are: 100.00% - 18.67% = 81.33%.

8.

Entrance Percentage of Total

These percentages were determined from nonresident responses based upon the Peccia
study in manner consistent with that discussed in notes 1 and 7 above.
9.

Remaining Visitation Percentage of Total

Amounts are extensions of Visitors Willing to Visit by Entrance (note 7) and Entrance
Percentage of total (note 8).
Example (Alt. B, opt. 2/2, 2001): (62.78% X 62.59%) + (81.33% X 37.41%) = 69.72%
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SCHEDULE OF DECREASES TO DIRECT, INDIRECT AND INDUCED, AND OUTPUT
DUE TO TOURISM ECONOMIC LOSSES (note 1)
GLACIER NATIONAL PARK RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT ALTERNATIVES
for GOING-TO-THE-SUN ROAD
(Amounts in 1997 dollars and jobs)

Direct Impacts
Year
(note 2)

1997
Spending
(note 3)

Personal
Income
(note 4)

Annual
Job
Losses
(note 5)

Indirect and Induced Impacts
Annual
1997
Personal
Job
Spending
Income
Losses
(note 3)
(note 4)
(note 5)

Output Impact
1997
Spending
(note 3)

Personal
Income
(note 4)

Annual
Job
Losses
(note 5)

ALTERNATIVE A: ACCELERATED PROJECT LOSSES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Losses

$11,900,000
12,021,000
12,142,000
12,263,000
12,385,000
12,506,000
12,627,000
12,749,000
12,870,000
12,991,000
$124,454,000

$3,732,000
3,770,000
3,808,000
3,846,000
3,884,000
3,922,000
3,960,000
3,998,000
4,036,000
4,074,000
$39,030,000

246
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

$7,158,000 $2,336,000
7,231,000
2,360,000
7,303,000
2,384,000
7,376,000
2,408,000
7,449,000
2,432,000
7,522,000
2,456,000
7,595,000
2,479,000
7,668,000
2,503,000
7,741,000
2,527,000
7,814,000
2,551,000
$74,857,000 $24,436,000

109
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

$19,058,000 $6,068,000
19,252,000
6,130,000
19,445,000
6,192,000
19,639,000
6,254,000
19,834,000
6,316,000
20,028,000
6,378,000
20,222,000
6,439,000
20,417,000
6,501,000
20,611,000
6,563,000
20,805,000
6,625,000
$199,311,000 $63,466,000

356
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 2/2 PROJECT LOSSES
1
2
3
4
Losses

$18,343,000
18,530,000
15,830,000
15,988,000
$68,691,000

$5,753,000
5,812,000
4,965,000
5,014,000
$21,544,000

380
4
-56
3

$11,033,000 $3,601,000
11,146,000
3,638,000
9,522,000
3,108,000
9,617,000
3,139,000
$41,318,000 $13,486,000

169
2
-25
1

$29,376,000 $9,354,000
29,676,000
9,450,000
25,352,000
8,073,000
25,605,000
8,153,000
$110,009,000 $35,030,000

548
6
-81
5

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/1 PROJECT LOSSES
1
2
3
4
Losses

$18,343,000
18,530,000
18,717,000
15,988,000
$71,578,000

$5,753,000
5,812,000
5,870,000
5,014,000
$22,449,000

380
4
4
-56

$11,033,000 $3,601,000
11,146,000
3,638,000
11,258,000
3,675,000
9,617,000
3,139,000
$43,054,000 $14,053,000

169
2
2
-25

$29,376,000 $9,354,000
29,676,000
9,450,000
29,975,000
9,545,000
25,605,000
8,153,000
$114,632,000 $36,502,000

548
6
6
-82

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/3 PROJECT LOSSES
1
2
3
4
5
6
Losses

$18,343,000
18,530,000
18,717,000
15,988,000
16,146,000
16,304,000
$104,028,000

$5,753,000
5,812,000
5,870,000
5,014,000
5,064,000
5,113,000
$32,626,000

380
4
4
-56
3
3

$11,033,000 $3,601,000
11,146,000
3,638,000
11,258,000
3,675,000
9,617,000
3,139,000
9,712,000
3,170,000
9,807,000
3,201,000
$62,573,000 $20,424,000

168
2
1
-25
2
1

$29,376,000 $9,354,000
29,676,000
9,450,000
29,975,000
9,545,000
25,605,000
8,153,000
25,858,000
8,234,000
26,111,000
8,314,000
$166,601,000 $53,050,000

548
6
5
-81
5
4

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 4/2 PROJECT LOSSES
1
2
3
4
5
6
Losses

$18,343,000
18,530,000
18,717,000
18,904,000
16,146,000
16,304,000
$106,944,000

$5,753,000
5,812,000
5,870,000
5,929,000
5,064,000
5,113,000
$33,541,000

380
4
4
4
-57
3

$11,033,000 $3,601,000
11,146,000
3,638,000
11,258,000
3,675,000
11,371,000
3,711,000
9,712,000
3,170,000
9,807,000
3,201,000
$64,327,000 $20,996,000

168
2
1
2
-25
1

$29,376,000 $9,354,000
29,676,000
9,450,000
29,975,000
9,545,000
30,275,000
9,640,000
25,858,000
8,234,000
26,111,000
8,314,000
$171,271,000 $54,537,000

548
6
5
6
-82
4
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EXPLANATORY NOTES:
1.
Amounts in this schedule are in 1997 dollars and 1997 jobs to assure comparability with
current market conditions. Determining job losses from then-year values may result in an
overstatement of the impact on jobs since inflation is built into then-year spending.
IMPLAN modeling was utilized in these determinations.
2.

Year

Since values are maintained in 1997 dollars and jobs, we reported the impact by year of
contract performance rather than indicating a specific calendar year.
3.

Spending

Spending dollars represent total amounts spent by consumers. Direct spending are
amounts spent by the initial consumer which in this case is the traveler. Indirect and induced
spending are amounts spent by recipients of the direct spending for items such as salaries and
supplies and the spending of those salaries. Output spending is the total of direct, indirect and
induced spending.
4.

Personal Income

Personal income represents the employee compensation and proprietor’s income for
direct and indirect and induced economic impacts.
5.

Annual Job Losses

Job loss amounts represent the annual incremental decrease (increase) in jobs due to the
reduced spending by nonresident visitors (i.e. in year 1 of fast-track alternative option 2/2, total
job losses of 548 occurs and in year 3, total job recovery of 81 positions occurs). Job losses in
the first year of reconstruction are continued into subsequent years unless indicated by a job
recovery value; i.e., a negative value such as -81.
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SCHEDULE OF INCREASES TO OUTPUT
DUE TO CONSTRUCTION ECONOMIC GAINS (note 1)
GLACIER NATIONAL PARK RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT ALTERNATIVES
for GOING-TO-THE-SUN ROAD
(Amounts in 1997 dollars and jobs)

1997

Year

Then-Year
Spending
(Schedule 2)

Spending
(note 2)

Personal
Income
(note 2)

Annual
Job
Gains
(note 2)

ALTERNATIVE A: ACCELERATED PROJECT LOSSES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Gains

$3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
3,305,000
$33,050,000

$2,936,000
$2,851,000
$2,768,000
$2,687,000
$2,609,000
$2,533,000
$2,459,000
$2,388,000
$2,318,000
$2,251,000
$25,800,000

$975,000
947,000
920,000
893,000
867,000
841,000
817,000
793,000
770,000
748,000
$8,571,000

46
46

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 2/2
1
2
3
4
Gains

$7,485,000
7,485,000
7,485,000
7,485,000
$29,940,000

$6,650,000
6,457,000
6,269,000
6,086,000
$25,462,000

$2,209,000
2,145,000
2,083,000
2,022,000
$8,459,000

103
103

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/1
1
2
3
4
Gains

$7,485,000
7,485,000
7,485,000
7,485,000
$29,940,000

$6,650,000
6,457,000
6,269,000
6,086,000
$25,462,000

$2,209,000
2,145,000
2,083,000
2,022,000
$8,459,000

103
103

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 3/3
1
2
3
4
5
6
Gains

$4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
$28,386,000

$4,203,000
4,081,000
3,962,000
3,847,000
3,735,000
3,626,000
$23,454,000

$1,396,000
1,356,000
1,316,000
1,278,000
1,241,000
1,205,000
$7,792,000

65
65

ALTERNATIVE B: FAST-TRACK OPTION 4/2
1
2
3
4
5
6
Gains

$4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
4,731,000
$28,386,000

$4,203,000
4,081,000
3,962,000
3,847,000
3,735,000
3,626,000
$23,454,000

$1,396,000
1,356,000
1,316,000
1,278,000
1,241,000
1,205,000
$7,792,000

65
65
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EXPLANATORY NOTES:
1.
Amounts in this schedule are in 1997 dollars and 1997 jobs to assure comparability with
current market conditions. Determining job losses from then-year values may result in an
overstatement of the impact on jobs since inflation is built into then-year spending. Construction
economic gains in 1997 dollars were determined by de-escalating the then-year amounts by three
percent per year.
IMPLAN modeling was utilized in these determinations.
2.
Amounts were determined using the same multipliers as those in Bioeconomics report.
Refer to Schedule 4, notes 3, 4, and 5 for discussion of spending, personal income, and jobs.
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SCHEDULE OF FACTORS AND VALUES
for MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS
GLACIER NATIONAL PARK RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT ALTERNATIVES
for GOING-TO-THE-SUN ROAD

Description and Cross-reference of Factors and Values
Initial Year of Construction
Alt. A Construction expenditures - total project
Alt. B Construction expenditures - total project
Alt. A Construction period
Alt. B Construction period for options 3/3 and 4/2
Alt. B Construction period for options 2/2 and 3/1
Alt. A Construction expenditures - annual costs
Alt. B Construction expenditures - annual costs in 6 years
Alt. B Construction expenditures - annual costs in 4 years
Current program expenditures
Alt. A Net increase in construction expenditures
Alt. B Net increase in construction expenditures
Alt. B Net increase in construction expenditures
Montana's share of reconstruction
Inflation rate
Discount rate
Summer (Jun-Sep) visitation factor of annual

Factors & Values
2001
$105,000,000
$85,000,000
10
6
4
$10,500,000
$14,166,667
$21,250,000
$2,000,000
$8,500,000
$12,166,667
$19,250,000
25.00%
3.00%
7.00%
87.63%
4.03
5.1
2.75
$108.33
$110.82
$206.00

GNP visitors who are nonresidents of Montana (Peccia Q1)
West entrance % of total (Peccia Q4)
Visitors willing to take a one hour delay to the Logan Pass (Peccia Q7)
Visitors willing to come to Glacier with Logan Pass inaccessible (Peccia Q8)
Visitors willing to come if Logan Pass is accessible (Peccia Q9)
Hotel, Lodge, and B&B
Gasoline and oil
Restaurant and bar
Retail sales
Other

6
7
7
7
8
9

Statewide nonresident vacationers primarily attracted to Montana because of Glacier 25.00%
Statewide nonresident vacationers attracted to Montana because of Glacier
31.00%
Nonresident average length of stay in Glacier Area for Glacier visitor

3
3
3
1, 2
4
4
4
5
2
5
5

Number of reentries per visitor trip
Nonresident average length of stay in Montana for Glacier visitor
Nonresident average group size of Glacier visitor
Visitor group daily expenditure (statewide nonresident Glacier visitors: 1996)
Visitor group daily expenditure (Statewide Nonresidents: 1997 dollars)
Per-visitor trip expenditure (Statewide Nonresidents: 1997 dollars)

Sources &
Notes
1
2
2
1
1
1

7
7
3.2

80.50%
62.59%
83.47%
62.78%
81.33%

10
10
10
10
10
10

18.70%
20.60%
17.20%
24.40%
19.10%

7
7
7
7
7

SCHEDULE 6
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EXPLANATORY NOTES:
1.

Source: discussions with Larry Frederick of Glacier National Park.

2.

Source: Federal Highway Administration letter, dated April 6, 1998, by Carol H. Jacoby,
Division Engineer, including attachments.

3.

Computations:
$105,000,000 / 10 = $10,500,000
$ 85,000,000 / 6 = $14,166,667
$ 85,000,000 / 4 = $21,250,000

4.

Results from note 3 above less $2,000,000 in current program spending.

5.

Source: Bioeconomics, Inc.’s report (Duffield, undated).

6.

Source: The Glacier National Park Visitor Use Study (Miller and McCool, 1994)

7.

Source: Nonresident Summer Traveler to Montana (Parrish, Nickerson, and McMahon,
1997)

8.

Computation: 1997 CPI / 1996 CPI * $108.33 = 110.82.

9.

Computation: $110.82 × 51
. ÷ 2.75 = $205.52; rounded to $206.

10.

Source: Peccia (1997) modified to represent nonresident responses only.

APPENDIX B – PECCIA (1997) SURVEY RESULTS
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To obtain a copy of the survey results from
Vehicle Movement and Traffic Study, Glacier National Park, Montana
(Robert Peccia & Associates, 1997) please send an email request to
kmcmahon@forestry.umt.edu.

Thank you!

